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Abstract
The evolution of markets on which network externalities prevail can be expected to differ
from “classical markets” where no such externalities exist. We suggest a flexible formal
model that describes the dynamics of both types of markets. This leads to a stochastic
version of the well known replicator dynamics. Based on this approach we analyze the
limit behaviour of different market types where consumers use stochastic decision rules.
We show that the market shares converge to the set of equilibria with probability one,
where, even under network externalities, several technologies can coexist. On the other
hand, even if no network externalities prevail it is possible that only one technology stays
in the market. This paper contributes to the work on generalized urn schemes and path
dependent processes going on at IIASA.
JEL-Classification: D43, D62, D83
Keywords: Network Externalities, Increasing Returns, Lock-In, Replicator Dynamics.
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Network Externalities and the
Dynamics of Markets
Max Keilbach (keilbach@cs.tu-berling.de)
Martin Posch (martin.posch@univie.ac.at)
1 Introduction
The phenomenon of network externalities has received wide attention in the economic
literature. Rohlfs [1974] showed that this type of externalities play an important role in
the market of telecommunication where the utility of joining a communication network
is positively related to the number of its members. This result was confirmed by Callon
[1993] and Capello [1994]. However, what has been said for this market holds also for the
market of consumption and investment goods of high technological level (henceforth called
complex technologies). This is due to two interdependent reasons:
First, complex technologies usually require some complementary investment that puts
the technology to work. Think of training costs or of some linked product like computer
software: once a buyer has chosen a certain technology and realized the corresponding co-
investment he very probably sticks to his decision since the co-investment is experienced
as sunk cost.1
Second, through this procedure, the market of complex technologies is linked to some
extent to the market of complementary goods. This implies that ease of access to com-
plementary products influences the preference a buyer has for a technology standard as
such. If one technology standard dominates the market, its co-products can be expected
to be cheaper and easier to obtain. Moreover, it can be expected that the variety among
co-products is higher and thus more attractive for a new buyer. Think of access to software
or to persons who are trained on a certain technology.2 Thus, the decisions of buyers are
linked through the market of co-products which leads to an investment network. Hence,
the market exhibits network externalities. As an outcome of this “market failure”, the
dynamics of a market of such complex technologies can be expected to be fundamentally
1See David[1985] and Arthur[1983], Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski [1987].
2This topic has been extensively discussed in the literature. See again David [1985] who discusses this
relation for typewriters and the “market of secretaries”. Cowan[1990] tells a similar story for the market
of energy providing systems. Katz and Shapiro[1985, 1986] dealt with the question of network externalities
for a market that exhibits investment networks. Their studies are based on a comparative static approach
involving the assumption of rational expectations. Church and Gandal [1993] analyzed technology–co-
product relations by explicitly considering “hardware-software relations” in a general-equilibrium context.
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different to “classical markets”. Our aim is to present a simple model that describes the
dynamics of markets where network externalities prevail, neither assuming rational expec-
tations nor using a general equilibrium framework. We assume the agents to use a simple
stochastic decision rule based on demand functions that depend on prices and market
shares. This leads to a stochastic version of the well known replicator dynamics.
In the following section we define the model and introduce the market dynamics. In
the subsequent section we give some general results on the convergence of market shares.
Finally we illustrate this approach for a limited number of goods.
2 The Evolution of Markets with Network Externalities
2.1 A Decision Process under Network Externalities
Consider a market characterized by investment networks. Several types of technologies
compete that all fulfil the same task but have different technological characteristics and
hence they work with different standards3. When a potential buyer decides which type of
technology to purchase he or she looks at its relative price, at its market share, and at the
availability of its co-products.
Suppose at a certain time instant all competing technologies have the same market
share and are sold at the same price. We would expect a potential new buyer to be in-
different. Maybe he is indifferent and his decision is random. Or he prefers one of the
technologies, for which the reasons can be manifold: he may prefer certain special charac-
teristics that are attractive only to a small group of users. Or the outcome of the decision
is due to the bounded rationality of consumers: they might not be aware of all prices
and market shares, just imitate a friend, or do not like to follow the majority.4 Due to
the manifoldness of influences we do not expect the consumers’ initial choice to appear
deterministic. Instead, the outcome of the decision process appears random to us5. Once
the buyer made his first choice, he sticks with this initially chosen system (even in the
case of replacing investment) since otherwise the co-investment would be useless and the
sunk costs would be lost.
The consequence of a consumers’ decision is twofold. First, the market share of the
product increases. This increases the market of co-products and thus makes them easier
available. This again increases the probability that the next buyer chooses the same tech-
nology. Hence, via the market of co-products we can expect a positive demand feedback
on the market of technologies. We will describe this phenomenon with a parameter called
network-elasticity. Second, the producers, now confronted with new market shares, might
change the product-prices. Several reasons can play a role in this regard. Producers with
high market shares are confronted with less costs and might reduce the price or they can
3Think e.g. of different computer systems, of digital cassette recorders (DAT and DCC-systems) or –
on another scale – different energy providing systems[Cowan, 1990].
4Their motivation might be a “search for diversity”. See the discussion in Dosi and Kaniovski [1994].
5For a similar argument see Arthur[1983]
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use their advantage in the market to increase it.6 Price fluctuations change the consumers’
propensity to buy a product. The direction as well as the extent of this change are given by
the price-elasticity. This elasticity is usually expected to be negative but we do not exclude
positive price elasticities from our analysis. Thus, we can model negative and positive de-
mand feedbacks with respect to prices.7 Note that on a market with network externalities
a negative feedback from price dynamics might be traded off against a positive feedback
from market shares (see the discussion below).
2.2 The Model
Consider a market with K ≥ 2 firms, each producing one technology. We assume a perfect
correlation between the market of technologies and the market of co-products.8 Thus, we
can limit the analysis to the market shares of the base-technologies. Let ntk be the number
of units of technology k in the market at time t. Hence, the market share stk of technology
k at time t is given by stk = n
t
k/
∑K
i=1 n
t
i . We assume that initially all technologies are
present in the market, i.e. n1k > 0 for all k.
At each time t we assign a demand vector (Dt1, . . . , D
t
K) of non-negative numbers to
the technologies. The demand Dtk for technology k is a measure for the confidence the
buyers have in this technology.9 We assume that the demand for each technology depends
on its present market share. This maybe due to network externalities as well as pricing
policies that rely on market shares. Thus, for each technology k there is a demand function
Dk(·) : (0, 1]→ IR
+ such that
Dtk = Dk(s
t
k), t > 0.
Note that t is not chronological time but is defined by the sequential moments of
buying. The probability that the t-th buyer purchases a certain product is given by the
relative propensity to buy this product, defined as
dk(s
t) =
Dk(s
t
k)
K∑
i=1
Di(sti)
, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, (1)
where st = (st1, s
t
2, . . . , s
t
K) ∈ ∆ = {s|s ∈ IR
K , si ≥ 0,
∑K
i=1 si = 1}. Thus, the k-th
component of d(s) = (d1(s), . . . , dK(s)) ∈ ∆, which we call relative demand or preference
function, specifies the conditional probabilities of choosing technology k given the current
6See also the discussion in Dosi and Kaniovski [1994] and Dosi, Ermoliev and Kaniovski [1994].
7This issue has been discussed in a number of papers. See e.g. Arthur[1983], Arthur et al.[1987], David
[1985] or Dosi and Kaniovski [1994].
8This implies that a certain technology cannot use co-products that fit a different standard. This
assumption is straightforward for all types of technical co-products. The correlation can be less than one
in the case of human skills.
9This corresponds to the concept of strength in Arthur[1993].
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market shares of all technologies (i.e. given the vector st).10 This formalizes the decision
process discussed in section 2.1.11 Let nt = (n1t , . . . , n
t
K). Then the evolution of the market
is given by
nt+1 = nt + βt(st), (2)
where βt(s) denotes a sequence of K-dimensional independent random vectors whose
distribution depends on s in such a way that P{βt(s) = ek} = dk(s), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, where
ek, 1 ≤ k ≤ K denotes the k-th unit vector.
If network externalities are present the demand of the consumer that buys at time t+1
depends not only on the price of the product at time t but also on the present market
share. A quite general class of demand functions that depend on the market share and on
price is given by
Dk(s
t
k) = (s
t
k)
σk · [pk(s
t
k)]
ρk, (3)
where ρk denotes the elasticity of demand for technology k with respect to its price and
σk stands for its elasticity with respect to its market share. In the remainder of this paper
we will refer to σk as network elasticity. Let us assume that the pricing policy of firm k
can be described through a share-response function that is denoted by pk(s
t
k).
12
It should be noted that the number of variables that can have an influence on the choice
– like different technological characteristics or influences of friends – can be implicitly
included in this demand function. Note that by equation (3) the demand does not shift if
the price rises (falls) but the market share falls (rises) simultaneously.
3 Market Dynamics and the Replicator Equation
The dynamics of market shares can be interpreted as an urn scheme of the type studied in
Arthur [1983], Arthur et al. [1987], Dosi and Kaniovski [1994], Dosi et al. [1994]: Consider
an urn of infinite capacity with balls of K different colors. At each time step a ball is
added. The color is chosen randomly and the probability for each color is given by a so
called urn function q(·) : ∆→ ∆ which is a function of the present distribution of balls in
the urn. The application to the market dynamics is straightforward. The urn is associated
with the market. Consumers choice among technologies corresponds to adding of a ball.
The market shares are identified with proportions of balls in the urn. Finally, the urn
10The concept of function (1) is very closely related to the notion of allocation function used by Arthur
et al. [1987], Dosi and Kaniovski [1994], Dosi et al. [1994].
11Another interpretation is the following: assume that Dtk gives the number of potential buyers that
prefer technology k at time t. At every time t, indicating a moment of buying, a buyer is randomly chosen
from the set of potential buyers and buys the preferred technology. Thus, the probability that at time t
technology k is chosen is again given by dk(s
t).
12For a further discussion of this behaviour see section 4.
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function is just the relative demand function d(s). In the following analysis we extend
some standard results on urn processes, i.e. on the limit distribution of balls when the
number of additions goes to infinity.13
First we formulate the market dynamics for shares and establish the connection to
replicator dynamics. Then we prove that the market shares converge almost surely to a
random vector living on the fixed points (Theorem 1) of the dynamics. In Theorem 2 we
distinguish attainable and unattainable fixed points, i.e. fixed points to which the process
converges with positive resp. zero probability. Finally, we handle two special cases, where
the elasticity of the demand functions with respect to market shares is always greater
(resp. less) than 1. We give here only sketches of the proofs. The exact proofs are given in
the appendix. Writing equation (2) in terms of market shares the evolution is given by14
st+1 = st +
1
n+ t
[
βt(st)− st
]
, (4)
where n = n11 + n
1
2 + . . .+ n
1
K denotes the initial number of goods in the market. Adding
and subtracting the term 1n+t d(s) =
1
n+t (d1(s), d2(s), . . . , dK(s)) to equation (4) yields
st+1 = st +
1
n+ t
[
d(st)− st
]
+
1
n+ t
[
βt(st)− d(st)
]
. (5)
Since E (β(s)) = d(s) we have E(st+1|st) = st + 1n+t
[
d(st)− st
]
and, consequently, on
average system (5) shifts from a point s at time t by 1n+t [d(s)− s]. Hence, the limit points
of the system (if any) belong to the set of zeros of d(s)− s. At these points the expected
motion is 0. We call these points the fixed points of the system. The limit dynamics of
the stochastic process (5) is closely related to the asymptotic behaviour of the differential
equation
s˙ = d(s)− s,
which can be written as
s˙k =
Dk(sk)∑K
j=1Dj(sj)
− sk, k = 1, . . . , K. (6)
To prove convergence of the market dynamics we have to introduce some smoothness condi-
tions for the demand functions. For all s > 0 they have to be positive and twice continuosly
differentiable. For technical reasons we assume additionally that D(0) := lims→0Dk(s) ex-
ists or Dk(s)→∞ for s→ 0 (then we set Dk(0) =∞) and that lims→0Dk(s)/s exists or
Dk(s)/s→∞ for s→ 0 (in the latter case we write D
′
k(0) =∞). The fixed points of (6)
are points s¯ ∈ ∆ such that Dk(s¯k) <∞ and
Dk(s¯k)∑K
i=1Di(s¯i)
= s¯k for all k.
13See Arthur [1983], Arthur et al. [1987], Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski [1988a, 1994], Pemantle [1990]
and Posch[1994].
14See Arthur et al. [1987], Dosi and Kaniovski [1994], Dosi et al. [1994].
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Replicator Dynamics By Hofbauer and Sigmund [1988, p. 92] the phase portrait of
differential equation (6) does not change if we multiply it by a positive factor. Thus,
multiplying by
∑K
j=1Dj(sj), we get the new differential equation
s˙k = Dk(sk)− sk
K∑
j=1
Dj(sj), k = 1, . . . , K. (7)
We see that the market share of technology k increases (decreases, remains constant)
if Dk(sk) > sk
∑K
j=1Dj(sj) (respectively “<” or “=”). We now define the fitness of
technology k by
Gk(sk) :=
Dk(sk)
sk
for all sk ∈ (0, 1] and k = 1, . . . , K. (8)
For the boundary we set Gk(0) = limsk→0Gk(sk) ∈ IR ∪ {∞}. In the interior of ∆ and all
boundary faces where the fitnesses are finite, equation (7) becomes
s˙k = sk (Gk(sk)− G¯(s)), k = 1, . . . , K, (9)
where G¯(s) =
∑K
j=1 sj G(sj) gives the average fitness. (9) restricted to ∆ is a well studied
replicator equation (see Hofbauer and Sigmund[1988] and Hofbauer, Schuster and Sigmund
[1981]).
Hence, the dynamics of the market corresponds to a replicator dynamics, where the
“fitness” of a product is given by the ratio of demand and market share. We see from
equation (9) that, if the fitness of a technology is greater (smaller) than the average fitness
(which is equal to the sum of absolute demand), its market share increases (decreases).
Thus, the fitness of a product is its capacity to stay in the market or even to take over
the whole market.
Note that even a technology with a low absolute demand can have a high fitness. Thus,
a low absolute demand does not automatically lead to extinction of the technology. Also a
high absolute demand for a technology does not assure that it will survive. Additionally,
even if the relative demand for a product increases with its market share, its fitness might
decrease, if the absolute demand grows slower than the market share. Also, if σk = 1 for
all k (i.e. if network externalities are present!), the fitness of a technology depends only
on its price level (see (3) and (8)).
Stochastic processes of the type studied here may not converge but exhibit a cyclic
behaviour.15 However, for the market dynamics we can show the following Theorem:
Theorem 1 Let Z denote the set of fixed points of (7) and assume that Z is finite. Then
the market shares converge almost surely and P (limt→∞ s¯
t ∈ Z) = 1.
15See Posch[1997], Barucci and Posch[1996], Bena¨ım[1996].
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The argument exploits that (7) is a Shashahani gradient system[Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1988] and thus, all solutions of the differential equation converge to fixed points. To refor-
mulate this result to the stochastic process we need an extension of standard stochastic
approximation results to handle demand functions that go to infinity at the boundary (as
e.g. the demand function given by (3)).
Not all fixed points of (7) are attained in the limit with positive probability. Denote
the share elasticity of Dk with respect to s, by δk(s) =
D′k(s)
Dk(s)
s. If, at a fixed point s¯ in
the interior of ∆, all δk(s¯k) are less than 1 then the fixed point is attained with positive
probability. If two or more of these elasticities are larger than 1 then the fixed point is
attained with probability 0. If exactly one elasticity is less than one then the fixed point
can be attainable or unattainable depending on a more complicated condition. This is
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let s¯ ∈ Z be a fixed point and set supp(s) = { k | sk > 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ K }.
Assume that:
(a) δk(s¯k) 6= 1, for all k ∈ supp(¯s),
(b) D′k(s¯k) 6=
∑K
l=1Dl(s¯l), for all k /∈ supp(¯s),
(c) the term in (10) is not zero.
Then the necessary and sufficient conditions that P (limt→∞ s
t = s¯) > 0 are D′k(0) <∑K
l=1Dj(s¯l), for all k /∈ supp(¯s), and
1) δk(s¯k) < 1 for all k ∈ supp(¯s), or
2) there exists exactly one l ∈ supp(¯s) such that δl(s¯l) > 1 and
∑
k∈supp(s¯)
s¯2k
Dk(s¯k) (δk(s¯k)− 1)
> 0. (10)
The argument exploits that the sinks of the differential equation correspond to the maxima
of the potential. By theorem 8 in (Posch[1994]) sinks are attained with positive probabil-
ity.For the non-convergence part, that is saddles and sources, we extend results of Arthur
et al. [1988a] and Pemantle [1990]. Namely, we prove that unstable fixed points on the
boundary of the simplex, i.e. where the share of one color is zero, are attained in the limit
with probability zero (Arthur et al. [1988a] and Pemantle [1990] looked at interior points
only).
In the next two statements we discuss the special case where the share-elasticity of
all demand functions is greater (resp. less) than 1 on the whole interval (0, 1]. Then there
exists at most one fixed point in the interior of ∆. If these elasticities are all less than 1 this
fixed point is attained with probability one. Thus the outcome of the market dynamics is
deterministic in this case. If the demand functions for all technologies are the same, the
fixed point is in the interior of ∆. Hence, in the limit all technologies coexist.
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Theorem 3 If for all s in the interior of ∆, δk(sk) < 1, k = 1, . . . , K then there exists
an s¯ ∈ ∆ such that P (limt→∞ s
t = s¯) = 1.
If D′k(0) = D
′
l(0), 0 ≤ k, l ≤ K then s¯ is in the interior of ∆.
In the opposite case where all share-elasticities are greater than 1 the market dynamics
converges to one of the vertices of the simplex ∆. Hence, in the limit only one technology
survives. If the demand functions for all technologies are identical, each vertex is attained
with positive probability. Thus, the market outcome is random and path dependent.
Theorem 4 Assume that for all s in the interior of ∆, δk(s) > 1, k = 1, . . . , K.
Then P (limt→∞ s
t ∈ E) = 1, where E = {e1, . . . , eK} denotes the set of vertices.
If D′k(0) = D
′
l(0), 0 ≤ k, l ≤ K, then P (limt→∞ s
t = ek) > 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K.
In the proofs of theorems 3 and 4 we adapt a result on replicator dynamics in Hofbauer
et al. [1981] and show that the potential of (7) has a unique extremum.
4 Dynamics of Markets Under Different Scenarios
So far the model has been formulated for K goods. Let us now illustrate the dynamic
behaviour of a market with network externalities where three commodities compete (K =
3). In Section 2.1 we argued that firms change the price of their products as market shares
change. That is we assume that the pricing policy of firm k can be described by a share-
response function that we denote by pk(s
t
k).
16 This implies the assumption that firms
base their price settings on their average costs (which includes “normal profit”, i.e. the
opportunity costs of production) such that the minimum price of the product equals its
average costs. Moreover, we assume that with increasing market share firms can extend
their production capacity and hence they experience a sinking long-term average cost
function17. A simple specification of this behaviour is that the price is just the reciprocal
value of the market share:18
pk(sk) =
ak
sk
, (11)
where ak are constants. We call function (11) a share-response function and assume for
simplicity that this function is identical for all K firms, i.e. ak = a. Fig. 1 gives a graphical
representation of the domain ∆ projected on the plane.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the domain ∆ (projected on the plane) where the
dynamics of shares evolves.
σ
ρ0
1
-1
a)
b)d)
c)
σ−ρ =1σ−ρ >1
σ−ρ <1
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the three scenarios in the ρ-σ-space. For parameters
in the bright region only one technology survives in the limit. For parameters in the dark
region all technologies coexist in the limit with equal market shares. On the line separating
the regions the technologies coexist in the limit – their limit market shares are however
random.
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4.1 The Scenarios
Let us analyze the market behaviour under different elasticity parameters ρ and σ. Ba-
sically, four areas of the (ρ, σ)-space are conceptually interesting (see Figure 2)19. We
consider the demand to be
a) price- and network-inelastic: ρ ∈ (−1, 0], σ ∈ [0, 1),
b) price-inelastic and network-elastic: ρ ∈ (−1, 0], σ > 1,
c) price-elastic and network-inelastic: ρ < −1, σ ∈ [0, 1),
d) price- and network-elastic: ρ < −1, σ > 1.
The cases where ρ = −1 (resp. σ = 1) are of special interest since then demand is neither
price- (resp. network-) elastic nor inelastic. We therefore will refer to intermediate elastic-
ity.20 Additionally, the cases where one of the elasticities vanishes is of special interest: if
σ = 0 this corresponds to a “classical” market without network externalities and if ρ = 0
to a market where consumers are indifferent with respect to prices. To investigate the
dynamics for different elasticities we insert function (11) into (3) to obtain
Dk(sk) = a
ρ sσ−ρk . (12)
4.2 Emerging Market Dynamics
Since the elasticity of (12) with respect to market share is σ−ρ, the above mentioned four
cases can be analyzed by considering the following three scenarios: σ − ρ = 1, σ − ρ > 1
and σ − ρ < 1. We show in which of these scenarios all three technologies coexist in the
time limit and in which only one technology survives. A summary of the results is given
in Figure 2.
I. Let us start with σ−ρ = 1, which encompasses the two reference cases ρ = −1, σ =
0, i.e. a “classical” market with intermediate price elasticity and σ = 1, ρ = 0,
i.e. intermediate network externality and no price elasticity. The demand functions
simplify to Dk(sk) = a
ρsk and by (1) the relative demand for k equals the existing
proportion of k in the market (i.e. dk(s) = sk). The fitnesses of the technologies are
constants and independent of market shares.
16We could also assume that the price depends on the market shares of the other technologies or is also
stochastic. To simplify the subsequent analysis we assume that it depends only on its market share. A
similar approach was chosen by Dosi and Kaniovski [1994] and Dosi et al. [1994].
17The model studied here is intrinsically dynamic. Since the production structure, hence costs, is subject
to change with time we consider the long-term average cost function (see e.g. Varian, 1995).
18A more complex price function is analyzed in Keilbach and Posch [1997]. See section 5 for a brief
discussion of the results.
19In the following discussion we consider neither positive price elasticities nor negative network elasticities
explicitly. Note however that these cases may be derived from the analysis given in section 4.2.
20Some economic textbooks refer to unitary elasticity. See e.g. Pinola and Sher[1981].
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In this case the shares converge with probability one.21 Moreover, the limit of shares
is (conditional on the initial condition) Dirichlet-distributed with the density func-
tion
fD(s) =
{
c · s
n1
1
−1
1 s
n1
2
−1
2 s
n1
3
−1
3 for s ∈ ∆
0 else
(13)
where n11, n
1
2, n
1
3 ≥ 1 are the initial numbers of products of each technology in the
market and c = Γ(n1+n2+n3)
Γ(n1)Γ(n2)Γ(n3)
. Thus, we cannot predict to which point in ∆ the
market shares converge. This implies, that even under positive network externalities
(namely in all cases where σ = 1 + ρ), all three technologies coexist in the limit.
If n11 = n
1
2 = n
1
3 = 1 the limit distribution is uniform on ∆ (see Figure 3.I for
an illustration). Note that this case is not generic, i.e. small deviations from the
condition σ − ρ = 1 will lead to different market behaviours. This will be discussed
in turn.
II. σ−ρ > 1. This scenario encompasses the scenarios b), c), d) and half of the parameter
space of scenario a) (see Figure 2). In these cases the share elasticity δk(·) of the
demand functions is greater than one. Thus, by theorem 4 the process converges
with probability one to one of the vertices and each vertex, i.e. the point (1,0,0)
and its permutations, is attained with positive probability. Thus, the market locks
into one technology but we cannot predict into which one. To this case (illustrated in
Figure 3.II) the discussion on path-dependence and “lock-in” usually refers. However,
network externalities are not a necessary condition for lock-in and the emergence of
a monopoly. It can also be a result of the price dynamics if the price elasticity is less
than −1.22
III. σ − ρ < 1. This encompasses the other half of region a) where both parameters are
inelastic. It also includes conceptually less plausible cases where σ < 0 and ρ > 0.
Now the share elasticities δk(s) are less than one. Thus, by Proposition 3 there is
an interior fixed point s¯ such that P (limt→∞ s
t = s¯) = 1. By symmetry we have
s¯ =
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
. See Figure 3.III for an illustration.
This result is somewhat counterintuitive since it encompasses the cases σ ∈ [0, 1), ρ=
0. That is technologies will coexist although positive network externalities prevail
on the market. This is due to the fact that the demand for a technology increases
slower than its market share. Hence, its fitness actually decreases with market share.
Thus, positive network externalities do not automatically imply lock-in effects.
21See Arthreya[1969].
22One might argue that a firm will modify its pricing behaviour to stay in the market. However, as firms
base their pricing behaviour on average costs, small firms may be driven out of the market due to higher
cost of production. Thus, a monopoly emerges with probability one.
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Figure 3: Probability distribution of market shares at t = 30 given share response function
(11), n11 = n
1
2 = n
1
3 = 1 and the three scenarios: (I) σ − ρ = 1, (II) σ − ρ > 1, (III)
σ − ρ < 1.
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Also if σ = 0 and the price response is inelastic (ρ > −1) no monopoly emerges in
our model. Note finally that scenario III includes also the case ρ = σ = 0, i.e. where
consumers do not respond to any signal from the market. Although admittedly
implausible it is interesting to observe that such a behaviour will equally lead to
coexistence of all technologies.
5 Summary and Outlook
This paper deals with markets where different technologies compete that all fulfill the
same task but have different characteristics. We analyze the behaviour of such markets
for different levels of price- and network-elasticities. To this purpose we specify demand
functions that depend not only on the price of a technology but also on its market share.
Based on these functions we define conditional probabilities of buying a certain technology.
Assuming that firms decrease their prices if their market share increases we can identify
the dynamics and limit states of these markets.
We illustrate this for a market where three goods compete under several constellations
of elasticity parameters. The model thus encompasses “classical” markets, i.e. markets
where no network externalities prevail. Several interesting results are obtained. First, if
no network externalities exist and demand is inelastic, none of the technologies is pushed
out of the market and all technologies have in the limit identical market shares. If however
demand is elastic only one of the technologies survives, i.e. monopoly emerges. If demand
is “intermediate” (i.e. neither elastic nor inelastic) all technologies coexist but it is not
possible to predict the distribution of market shares.
Second, even if network externalities prevail all technologies may coexist in the market
if the demand is network inelastic. Thus, a market dynamic as we know it from the story
of the QWERTY-keyboard or the market of video recorders (as discussed in section 2.1)
can only emerge in a relatively limited area of the parameter space. Thus – to come back
to the question asked in the title – it is not certain that Bill Gates’ operating system will
oust the others from the market.
In Keilbach and Posch[1997] we analyze the model for a different share response func-
tion. Here, firms first decrease their prices with market share but increase it once a certain
critical market share is passed. Here we obtain a whole spectrum of possible market out-
comes. We show that even if network externalities prevail on a market it is possible that
several (but not necessarily all) technologies coexist. Our approach is not restricted to
simple continuous share-response functions. On the contrary, the flexibility of the chosen
approach allows for integration of arbitrary (or even stochastic) share-response behaviour.
The choice of this function is of course of decisive influence on the market dynamics.
At present, we run an empirical investigation of the model. Once econometric estimates
of the demand functions and of the share response behaviour are obtained the approach
we suggest here should allow for empirical investigation (i.e. prediction) of markets where
network externalities prevail.
–14 –
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Appendix
A note on the notation Since the dynamics given by (9) leaves the simplex ∆ invariant,
we have stK = 1 −
∑K−1
k=1 s
t
k, ∀t > 0. Thus, the system can be reduced to the first K − 1
dimensions. Then we get a dynamics on ∆¯ = {s ∈ IRK−1 | si ≥ 0,
∑K−1
i=1 si ≤ 1}. In
the literature on urn processes mainly the K − 1-dimensional notation is used, while
the analysis of the replicator equation was mainly done in the K−dimensional setting. To
apply the results on urn processes (including proposition 1) we have to translate the results
between the two setups. While the characterization of fixed points is the same in both
setups, the stability conditions have to be adapted. Let s˙ = g(s) denote a vector field on ∆
that leaves ∆ invariant. Hence,
∑K
k=1 gk(s) = 0, ∀s ∈ ∆. The equivalent K−1 dimensional
system is then given by s˙k = gk(s1, . . . , sK−1, 1−
∑K−1
l=1 sl), k = 1, . . . , K−1 and is defined
on ∆¯. Thus, the tangent space of each interior point in ∆¯ is given by IRK−1. The tangent
space for interior points in ∆ for s˙ = g(s) restricted to ∆ is {ξ ∈ IRK |
∑K
k=1 ξk = 0}.
Denote the Jacobian of g(·) by Dg, the one of
(
gk(s1, . . . , sK−1, 1−
∑K−1
l=1 sl)
)K−1
k=1
by
Dg¯. Hence, a fixed point s ∈ ∆ is a linearly stable fixed point of s˙ = g(s) restricted to ∆
if
〈Dg(s), ξ, ξ〉 < 0, ξ ∈ {ζ ∈ IRK |
K∑
k=1
ζk = 0}
which holds if and only if
〈Dg¯(s1, . . . , sK−1, 1−
K−1∑
l=1
sl) ξ, ξ〉 < 0, ξ ∈ R
k−1,
i.e. that (s1, . . . , sK−1) is hyperbolically stable for s˙k = gk(s1, . . . , sK−1, 1−
∑K−1
l=1 sl), k =
1, . . . , K − 1 .
Proposition 1 Let st be an urn process with a C1 urn function d as specified in (2) and
let s¯ ∈ ∆ be a hyperbolically unstable fixed point of the vector field s˙ = d(s)− s restricted
to ∆.
Then
P ( lim
t→∞
st = s¯) = 0.
Proof Let I = { i |¯si = 0}. By (if necessary) relabeling technologies we can assume that
I ⊂ {1, . . . , K − 1}. Hence,
K−1∑
k=1
s¯k < 1. (14)
For the proof we use the K − 1 dimensional notation. For simplicity we denote the
K−1-dimensional vectors again by s¯ = (s¯k)
K−1
k=1 and the K−1 dimensional vector field by
s˙ = f(s). Now, s¯ ∈ ∆¯ is a hyperbolically unstable fixed point of the K−1 dimensional vector
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field f . If s¯ lies in the interior of ∆¯ then the non-convergence follows from proposition 1
in Pemantle [1990]. Thus, we assume in the following that s¯ lies on the boundary of ∆¯.
For the proof we have to consider two cases. First, we assume that at least one of
the eigenvectors corresponding to an eigenvalue with positive real part points away from a
boundary surface of ∆¯ (lemma 2). Second we consider the remaining case where all such
eigenvectors lie in one of the boundary surfaces (lemma 3). To make this exact we use the
notion of saturated fixed points, introduced by Hofbauer (1990).
Definition: s¯ is said to be a saturated fixed point if all eigenvalues of the matrix
A :=
(
∂fi
∂sj
(¯s)
)
i,j∈I
have non-positive real part.
Lemma 1 If s¯ is not saturated then there is a d > 0, a neighbourhood U of s¯, and a vector
v ∈ IRK−1, vi ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , K − 1, vi = 0 ∀i /∈ I, ||v|| = 1 such that for all s¯ ∈ U
〈f(s), v〉 > d 〈s, v〉 (15)
This is shown in the proof of proposition 1 of Hofbauer (1990).
Lemma 2 Assume s¯ is not saturated. Then P (limt→∞ s
t = s¯) = 0.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that P (limt→∞ s
t = s¯) > 0. Choose a neighbourhood U
of s¯, a vector v, and a d > 0 as specified in lemma 1. Then there exists a T > 1 such that
P ({limt→∞ s
t = s¯} ∩ {st ∈ U, t > T}) > 0 Let τ be the following stopping time
τ =
{
min t > T : st /∈ U, if there is a finite t > T s.t. st /∈ U ;
∞ otherwise
.
We show that
P ( lim
t→∞
〈st, v〉 = 0 | τ =∞) = 0. (16)
Since vi > 0 for at least one i such that s¯i = 0 this proves the proposition. We first show
that
P ( lim
n→∞
〈nt, v〉 =∞| τ =∞) = 1. (17)
Let Jv = { i | vi > 0}. Then (17) holds if P (limt→∞
∑
i∈Jv
nti =∞|τ =∞) = 1. Since the
nti are monotonically increasing, we get
sti =
nti
n+ t
≥
n1i
n+ t
≥
1
n+ t
, i = 1, . . . , K − 1. (18)
By (15), (18), and since ||v|| = 1 we get for all t > T
P (
∑
i∈Jv
βti(s
t) = 1) ≥ E
(∑
i∈Jv
βti(s
t)
∣∣∣F t) ≥ E(〈βt(st), v〉 ∣∣∣F t)
≥ E
(
〈βt(st)− st), v〉
∣∣∣F t) ≥ d 〈st, v〉 ≥ d
n+ t
By construction of βt there exists a sequence of independent random variables χt, t ≥ 1
such that
∑
i∈Jv
βti(y¯
t) ≥ χt ≥ 0 and P (χt ≥ 1) ≥ dn+t for all sequences y¯
t ∈ U satisfying
y¯ti >
1
n+t , i = 1, . . . , K − 1. Since
∑∞
t=1 P (χ
t ≥ 1) =∞, by the Borel-Cantelli lemma we
get
∑∞
t=1 χ
t =∞ a.s. Hence (17) holds true.
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For a t > 0 let Et denote the set of all paths where 〈nt, v〉 > 1d , i.e. E
t = {〈nt, v〉 > 1d}.
Note, that Et is F t-measurable and since nt is increasing in t, for all t′ > t we have
Et
′
⊇ Et. Hence, by (17) we have limt→∞ P (E
t | τ =∞) = 1.
Now we prove (16) by contradiction. Assume that P (limt→∞〈s
t, v〉 = 0 | τ = ∞) > 0.
Then there is a T ′ > T such that
P (ET
′
∩ {τ =∞} ∩ { lim
t→∞
〈st, v〉 = 0}) > 0. (19)
Let Gt = {t < τ} ∩ ET
′
. We claim that 1Gt
1
〈st,v〉 is a supermartingale. By (18) we have
sti > 0 for all t and thus,
1
〈st,v〉 is finite for all t. Let t > T
′ be arbitrary but fixed. On the
F t-measurable set Gt the process is not equal to zero and thus, by (2)
1Gt E
( 1
〈st+1, v〉
−
1
〈st, v〉
∣∣∣F t) = 1Gt E(n+ t+ 1〈nt+1, v〉 − n+ t〈nt, v〉
∣∣∣F t)
= 1Gt E
(〈st, v〉 − (n+ t) 〈βt, v〉
〈st, v〉 〈st + βt, v〉
∣∣∣F t)
≤ 1Gt
1
〈nt, v〉
(
1−
n+ t
〈st, v〉+ 1
E
(
〈βt, v〉
∣∣∣F t)) (20)
On Gt we have st ∈ U , and thus, by (15) we get 1Gt E
(
〈βt, v〉
∣∣∣F t) ≥ 1Gt d 〈st, v〉.
Substituting st by n
t
n+t we get by (20)
1Gt E
( 1
〈st+1, v〉
−
1
〈st, v〉
∣∣∣F t) ≤ 1Gt 1〈nt, v〉
[
1−
(d+ 1) 〈nt, v〉
〈nt, v〉+ 1
]
≤ 0.
Since Gt is F t-measurable and Gt+1 ⊂ Gt, we proved that
E
(
1Gt+1
1
〈st+1, v〉
− 1Gt
1
〈st, v〉
∣∣∣F t) ≤ 0,
and hence 1Gt
1
〈st,v〉 is a non-negative supermartingale. Thus, the limit s
∗ = limt→∞
1
〈st,v〉 ·
1Gt exists a.s. Now, by the Fatou lemma we have
E(s∗) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
E
(
1Gt
1
〈st, v〉
∣∣∣F t) ≤ 1
〈sT ′ , v〉
<∞.
Hence, s∗ < ∞ a.s. and thus, P (ET
′
∩ {τ = ∞} ∩ {limt→∞〈s
t, v〉 = 0}) = 0, which
contradicts with (19). 2
Lemma 3 Assume s¯ is saturated. Then P (limt→∞ s
t = s¯) = 0.
Proof: Let E+ denote the eigenspace corresponding to the eigenvalues of A with pos-
itive real part. We apply proposition 1 in Pemantle [1990], checking conditions (i)- (iv).
Conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) are straightforward. Condition (iii) reads:
There exists a neighbourhood U of s¯, a c > 0 such that for all unit vectors
θ ∈ E+, all s ∈ U and all t > 1
E
(
〈(βtk(s)− sk)
K−1
k=1 , θ〉
+
∣∣∣F t) ≥ c,
where 〈 ., .〉+ = max(0, 〈 ., .〉).
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(Pemantle actually requires this inequality to hold for all θ in the tangent space of ∆¯.
However, in the proof he uses only the above weaker condition). Choose a unit vector θ in
E+ and set ǫ = mini/∈I s¯i. Since s¯ is a fixed point, for all i = 1, . . . , K−1, P (βi(¯s) = 1) =
s¯i. Thus,
E
(
〈βt(¯s)− s¯, θ〉+
∣∣∣F t)
=
K−1∑
i=1
P (βi(¯s) = 1)

θi − K−1∑
j=1
s¯jθj


+
+
(
1−
K−1∑
i=1
s¯i
)−K−1∑
j=1
s¯jθj


+
≥ ǫ
∑
i/∈I

θi −∑
j /∈I
s¯jθj


+
+
(
1−
∑
i/∈I
s¯i
)−∑
j /∈I
s¯jθj


+
. (21)
Since θ lies in the tangent space of E+ we have θi = 0, ∀i ∈ I and θ
∗ := maxi/∈I θi 6= 0.
If θ∗ > 0 then the first term in (21) is positive, since by (14)
∑
j /∈I s¯j < 1. If θ
∗ < 0 then
the second term is positive.
By continuity there is a neighbourhood U of s¯ and a c > 0 such that for all s ∈ U
E
(
〈(βtk(s)− sk)
K−1
k=1 , θ〉
+
∣∣∣F t) > c.
2
This completes the proof of proposition 1. In the following we use again the K-dimen-
sional notation. Let int∆ denote the interior of ∆ in the relative topology.
Proposition 2 Let s¯ ∈ int∆ be a fixed point of (9) such that
∑K
k=1
1
G′k(s¯k)
> 0 and
G′(s¯i) 6= 0 for all i.
1. If G′(s¯k) < 0, k = 1, . . . , K or
2. if there is exactly one l s.t. G′l(s¯l) > 0 and
∑K
k=1
1
G′k(s¯k)
> 0,
then s¯ is a sink. Otherwise s¯ is a saddle or source.
Proof: By Hofbauer and Sigmund [1988] (9) is a Shashahani gradient system for the
potential V (s) = −
∫ 1
s1
G1(t) dt −
∫ 1
s2
G2(t) dt− · · · −
∫ 1
sK
GK(t) dt. Thus, the fixed points
of (9) in int∆ are the critical values of V (·) restricted to ∆. To see this, let Ξ = {ξ ∈
IRK |
∑K
k=1 ξk = 0} denote the tangent vector space of ∆. Then for all fixed points s¯ ∈ int∆
〈∇V (¯s), ξ〉 =
K∑
k=1
Gk(s¯k) ξk = G1(s¯1)
K∑
k=1
ξk = 0, ∀ξ ∈ Ξ,
holds. The maxima of V (·) restricted to ∆ are the asymptotically stable points of (9). Since
(9) is a gradient system s¯ is a sink, if and only if for the Jacobian DV(·) of V (·) we have
〈DV(¯s) ξ, ξ〉 < 0, ∀ξ ∈ Ξ. (22)
If there is a ξ ∈ Ξ such that the inequality in the other direction holds then s¯ is a saddle
or source. DV(·) is a diagonal matrix given by DV(¯s) = (δijG
′
i(s¯i))ij. Thus, if condition
1 of the proposition holds (22) follows immediately.
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If condition 2 holds then assume w.l.o.g. that G′1(s¯1) > 0 and G
′
k(s¯k) < 0 for k > 1.
We give a proof by contradiction. Assume there exists a ξ ∈ Ξ such that 〈DV(¯s) ξ, ξ〉 > 0
we have |ξ1| > 0 and hence
G′1(s¯1) +
K∑
k=2
G′k(s¯k)
ξ2k
ξ21
> 0.
Set ξ′k =
ξk
ξ1
and note that |
∑K
k=2 ξ
′
k| = 1. Hence,
max
x∈IRK, |
∑K
k=2 xk|=1
G′1(s¯1) +
K∑
k=1
G′k(s¯k)x
2
k = G
′
1(s¯1) +
1∑K
k=2
1
G′k(s¯k)
> 0 (23)
A straightforward calculation shows, that (23) holds if and only if
∑K
k=1
1
G′k(s¯k)
< 0. This
is a contradiction to condition 2. Hence s¯ is a sink. With the same argument we see that
if
∑K
k=1
1
G′k(s¯k)
> 0, s¯ is not a local maximum of V (·) restricted to ∆ but a saddle or
minimum, and hence its a saddle or source for (7).
Finally, assume there exist k, l, k 6= l such that G′k(s¯k) > 0 and G
′
l(s¯l) > 0. For ξ ∈ Ξ
such that ξl = 1, ξk = −1 and ξj = 0, j 6= k, j 6= l we have 〈DV(¯s) ξ, ξ〉 > 0, and hence
the fixed point is a saddle or source.
2
Proposition 3 Let I ⊂ {1, . . . , K} and ∆I = { s | si = 0, ∀ i ∈ I } denote a boundary
face. Assume that Gi(0) < ∞ for all i ∈ I. Then ∆I is an invariant set. If s¯ ∈ ∆I is a
sink for (9) restricted to ∆I and
1. for all i ∈ I, Gi(0) <
∑K
j=1 s¯j Gj(s¯j) =: G¯(¯s) then s¯ is a sink for (7) on ∆.
2. there exists an i ∈ I such that Gi(0) >
∑K
j=1 s¯j Gj(s¯j) then s¯ is a saddle.
Proof: 1. By (if necessary) relabeling technologies we can assume that
s1 > 0, . . . , sm > 0, sm+1= · · ·=sK=0 for some m. Then the gradient ∇V is given by
∇V = (G¯, ..., G¯, Gm+1(0), ..., GK(0))
T . The tangent vector space at the boundary face ∆I
is given by ΞI = {ξ ∈ IR
K |
∑K
k=1 ξk = 0, ξi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I}. Thus, if Gi(0) < G¯, ∀i ∈ I then
〈∇V, ξ〉 ≤ 0 for all ξ ∈ ΞI . The inequality is strict for all ξ ∈ ΞI such that ∃i ∈ I, ξi > 0.
By our assumptions s¯ ∈ ∆I is a sink for (9) restricted to ∆I and hence a maximum of V
restricted to ∆I . It follows, that s¯ is a local maximum of V restricted to ∆. It remains to
show that s¯ is a hyperbolic fixed point. Since (9) is a gradient vector field, all eigenvalues
of its Jacobian are real. Thus, it suffices to show that the determinant is not zero. This
follows straightforward. The proof of statement 2. is analogous and thus omitted. 2
For every set A ⊂ IRK and ǫ > 0 set Uǫ(A) := {s¯ ∈ ∆ | D(¯s, A) < ǫ}, where D(¯s, A) =
inf s¯′∈A ||s−s
′||. The following lemma is a modification of proposition 7.3 in Nevel’son and
Has’minskii [1973].
Lemma 4 Let D ⊂ ∆ and consider the sequence
st+1 = st +
1
n+ t
f(st) +
1
n+ t
ξt (24)
Appendix 21
where st ∈ ∆, ∀t > 0. Assume there is a random time instant τ1 such that a.s. s
t ∈ D
for all t > τ1 and τ1 < ∞ a.s., that f : int∆ → IR
K is bounded and continuous, and ξt
is a sequence of uniformly bounded random vectors such that E
(
ξt
∣∣∣ st) = 0. Let c > 0
and assume that V is a strict C2 Liapunov function on A = {s | 0 < V (s) < c } ∩D. Let
E = D/A.
Then, for all ǫ > 0 there is a random time τ2 such that s
t ∈ Uǫ(E), ∀t > τ2 and τ2 <∞
a.s.
Proof: We extend the definition of V by setting V (s) = c, ∀s ∈ ∆/{s|V (s) < c}. Let
φ(x) be a positive monotone C2 function such that φ(x) = c, ∀x ≥ c and such that φ
is strictly monotone for all x < c. Then φ(V (s)) is again a C1 Liapunov function. To
simplify notation we set V (s) = φ(V (s)) in the following. Note that 〈∇V (s), f(s)〉 ≥ 0 for
all s ∈ D. A Taylor expansion gives for t > 0
V (st+1) ≥ V (st) +
1D(s
t)
n+ t
[
〈∇V (st), f(st)〉+ 〈∇V (st), ξt〉
]
−
L 1∆/D(s
t)
n+ t
−
L
t2
,
where 1D(s
t) is the indicator function of D, and L is an upper bound for |〈∇V (st), f(st)+
ξt〉| and the absolute value of the second order terms in the Taylor series. Then, for all
T2 > T1 we have
V (sT2) ≥ V (sT1) +
T2−1∑
t=T1
1D(s
t)
n+ t
〈∇V (st), f(st)〉+
T2−1∑
t=T1
1D(s
t)
n+ t
〈∇V (st), ξt〉
−
T2−1∑
t=T1
L 1∆/D(s
t)
n+ t
+
L
t2
.
The process
∑T2−1
t=T1
1D(st)
n+t ξ
t is an L2 martingale and converges a.s. for T2 → ∞. Also∑T2−1
t=T1
L1∆/D(st)
n+t +
L
t2
converges almost surely, since from some time on the process stays
in D a.s. Since V (s) is bounded∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
t=T1
1D(s
t)
n+ t
〈∇V (st), f(st)〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ <∞, a.s.
Hence, almost surely the paths of the process (24) are of the form
st+1 = st +
1
n+ t
f(st) + ǫt, (25)
where ǫt is a deterministic vector sequence such that
∣∣∑∞
t=1 ǫ
t
∣∣ <∞,∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
t=T1
1D(s
t)
n+ t
〈∇V (st), f(st)〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ <∞, (26)
and for each path there exists a T3 such that s
t ∈ D for all t > T3.
Now let ǫ > 0 and set U cǫ := D/Uǫ(E). Assume that a path stays from some time T1
onward in U cǫ . Let d = mins∈Ucǫ 〈∇V (s), f(s)〉. Then, d > 0 and∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
t=T1
1Ucǫ (s
t)
n+ t
〈∇V (st), f(st)〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
t=T1
d
n+ t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =∞,
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which is a contradiction with (26) since U cǫ ⊂ D. Hence, after a finite random time the
path leaves the set U cǫ . Now we prove that the path cannot enter the set U
c
2ǫ infinitely often.
Assume it would. Then there are times T3 < tl < t¯l < tl+1 such that s
t¯l ∈ Uǫ, s
tl ∈ U c2ǫ
and st ∈ U cǫ for all t¯l ≤ t ≤ tl+1. Choose an l0 > 0 such that for all t > t¯l0 we have
|
∑∞
l=t ǫ
l| ≤ ǫ2 . Thus, there is a C1 > 0 such that for all l > l0
ǫ ≤ |stl − st¯l | ≤
tl+1−1∑
t=t¯l
1
n+ t
|〈∇V (st), f(st)〉|+
ǫ
2
≤ C1
tl+1−1∑
t=t¯l+1
1
n+ t
+
ǫ
2
Hence, ǫ2C1 ≤
∑tl+1−1
t=t¯l+1
1
n+t . Thus, we obtain
∞∑
t=T3
1Ucǫ (s
t)
t+ n
〈∇V (st), f(st)〉 ≥
∞∑
l=l0
tl+1−1∑
t=t¯l+1
1
n+ t
〈∇V (st), f(st)〉
≥
∞∑
l=l0
d
tl+1−1∑
t=t¯l+1
1
n+ t
≥
∞∑
l=l0
d
ǫ0
2C1
=∞.
This gives again a contradiction with (26). 2
Let J = {i |Gi(0) =∞}.
Lemma 5 Consider the vector field (6) and let I ⊆ J. Then for all ǫ > 0 there is a δ > 0
such that for all s ∈ UI(ǫ, δ) = { s |
∑
i∈I si < δ, sj > ǫ, ∀ j ∈ J/I } ∩∆∑
i∈I
s˙i ≥
∑
i∈I
si.
Proof: Let ǫ > 0. We distinguish two cases. First, assume that there is an i∗ ∈ I such
that Di∗(0) > 0. Let L1 := sups∈∆
∑
i/∈J Dj(sj). Then, L1 <∞ and for s ∈ ∆ we get by
(7)
∑
i∈I
s˙i =
(∑
i∈I
si
) [ ∑
i∈I Di(si)(∑
i∈I si
)∑K
i=1Di(si)
− 1
]
≥
(∑
i∈I
si
) [ ∑
i∈I Di(si)(∑
i∈I si
) (∑
i∈I Di(si) + L1
) − 1
]
(27)
Set L2 = infs∈∆
∑
i∈I Di(si)∑
i∈I Di(si)+L1
. Since Di∗(0) > 0 we get L2 > 0. Now, let δ =
L2
2 .
Then, continuing (27), we get for all s ∈ UI(ǫ, δ)
∑
i∈I
s˙i ≥
(∑
i∈I
si
) [
L2∑
i∈I si
− 1
]
≥
∑
i∈I
si
Now consider the case where Di(0) = 0 for all i ∈ I. Let L3 = sups∈UI(ǫ,1)
∑K
i=1Di(si).
We have L3 <∞. Choose a δ > 0 such that
Di(s)
s > 2L3 for all s < δ and all i ∈ I. Then,
for s ∈ UI(ǫ, δ) we get by (7)
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∑
i∈I
s˙i =
(∑
i∈I
si
) [ ∑
i∈I Di(si)(∑
i∈I si
)∑K
i=1Di(si)
− 1
]
≥
(∑
i∈I
si
) [
2L3∑K
i=1Di(si)
− 1
]
≥
∑
i∈I
si
2
For I ⊂ {1, . . . , K} define BdI = { s ∈ ∆ | ∃i ∈ I s.t. si = 0 } and let J = {1 ≤ k ≤
K |Gk(0) =∞}. Thus, BdJ is the union of all boundary faces where at least one product
has infinite fitness. For all ǫ > 0 and I ⊆ J let δ(I, ǫ) > 0 be a number such that on
UI(ǫ, δ(I, ǫ)) we have
∑
j∈I s˙j ≥
∑
j∈I sj. Set ∆I = {s ∈ ∆ | si = 0 ∀i ∈ I}.
Lemma 6 Let I ⊆ J, and let V ⊆ BdJ/I . Assume there exists a neighbourhood U of V
such that on U ,
∑
i∈J/I si is a Liapunov function. Then
P ( lim
t→∞
〈st, v〉 = 0) = 0,
where v is a vector such that vi = 1 for all i ∈ J/I and zero otherwise.
Proof: This follows by the arguments for step (16) in lemma 2. 2
Proposition 4 Let D(s, BdJ) denote the distance between s and BdJ . Then
P{lim inf
t→∞
D(st, BdJ) = 0} = 0
Proof: For simplicity we assume that J = {1, . . . , K}. The other case follows by
analogy. In a first step we cover BdJ with sets of the form UI(ǫ, δ), defined in the above
lemma.
Let 0 < ǫ1 < 1 and set δ1 = mini∈J(δ(J/{i}, ǫ1), ǫ1). Note, that
WJ/{i} := UJ/{i}(ǫ1, δ1)
is a neighbourhood of the i-th vertex ∆J/{i}. For a finite set H, denote by |H | the cardinality
of H.
Let k > 1. Assume we have covered the edges ∆J/I , I ⊂ J, |I | = k with the neigh-
bourhoods WJ/I :=
⋃
H⊆I,|H|≤k UJ/H(ǫ|H|, δ|H|). Now choose an ǫk+1 < δk and set δk+1 =
1
2 minI⊆J,|I|=k+1 (δ(I, ǫk+1), (δk − ǫk+1)). Then for all sets I ⊆ J such that |I | = k + 1 we
have
∆J/I ⊆WJ/I :=
⋃
H⊆I,|H|≤k+1
UJ/H(ǫ|H|, δ|H|).
Thus, using this procedure iteratively we get neighbourhoods W{i} covering ∆{i}. The union
W = ∪i∈JW{i} covers BdJ .
To prove that the process does not approach the boundary BdI , we show by induction
in k, that from some time onwards the process does not belong to the sets WJ/I for all
I ⊆ J, |I | = k.
k = 1. Let i ∈ J be fixed. By lemma 5 V (s) =
∑
j∈J/{i} sj is a linear Liapunov function
on the set WJ/{i} = {s |
∑
j∈J/{i} sj < δ1}. There is an ǫ > 0 such that f is also a Liapunov
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function on A := {s ∈ ∆ |
∑
j∈J/{i} sj < δ1+ǫ}. Hence, by lemma 4 the process a.s. either
converges to the edge ei or it leavesWJ/{i} and does not return from some time onward. By
lemma 6 the process converges to ei with probability 0. Thus, a.s. from some time onward
the process does not belong to WJ/{i}.
Induction step. Let k > 1, Assume that for all I ⊂ J, |I | = k − 1 from some time
onward the process is not in WJ/I . Let I ⊆ J, |I | = k.
By the induction assumption from some time onward the process belongs to D =
∆/ ∪I⊂J,|I|=k−1 WJ/I . Since δk <
1
2(δk−1 − ǫk) there is an ǫ > 0 such that on A :=
D ∩ UJ/I(ǫk, δk + ǫ) = D ∩ {s¯ | V (¯s) ≤ δk + ǫ} the function V (s) =
∑
j∈J/I sj is a strict
Liapunov function. By lemma 4 the process converges either to the set BdJ/I or it leaves
the set WJ/I . By Corollary 6 the former occurs with probability 0. This rights the result.2
Proof of theorem 1: Assume first that all Gk, k = 1, . . . , K can be extended to
continuous functions on the whole interval [0, 1]. Then, by Hofbauer and Sigmund [1988]
(9) is a Shashahani gradient system for the potential V (s) = −
∫ 1
s1
G1(t) dt−
∫ 1
s2
G2(t) dt−
· · ·−
∫
sK
GK(t) dt. Thus, V is a strict C
1 Liapunov function for (7). Now, the result follows
by proposition 1 in Arthur et al. [1988b].
If some Gk cannot be continuosly extended to the whole interval by the conditions on the
demand functions it follows that lims→0Gk(s) =∞. By proposition 4 P (limt→∞ d(s
t, BdJ) =
0) = 0. Thus, there is an Ω′ with P (Ω′) = 1 such that for every elementary outcome ω ∈ Ω′
there exists an ǫ > 0 and a T > 0 such that for all t > T we have D(st(ω), BdJ) > ǫ. Addi-
tionally, since
(∑T2
t=1
1
n+t
[
βt(st)− d(st)
])
is an L2 martingale we can choose Ω′ such that
every path in Ω′ can be written as st+1(ω) = st+ 1n+t f(s
t(ω))+ǫt(ω), where f(s) := d(s)−s
and ǫt(ω) is a deterministic sequence of vectors such that ||
∑∞
t=1 ǫ
t|| < ∞. Let Uǫ(BdJ)
denote an ǫ-neighbourhood of BdJ . Since the vector field f is C
2 in ∆− Uǫ(BdJ) we can
apply proposition 1 in Bena¨ım [1993] to deduce that the limit sets are chain recurrent.
Since f is a gradient vector field on ∆−Uǫ(BdJ ) the only chain recurrent sets are the fixed
points. 2
Proof of theorem 2: Since G′k(sk) =
s2k
Dk(sk) (δk(sk)−1)
by propositions 2 and 3 s¯ is a
sink for (7) if and only if the above conditions hold, otherwise it is a source or saddle. In
the former case by proposition 8 in Posch [1994] we have P (limt→∞ s
t = s¯) > 0. In the
latter cases we apply proposition 1 and get P (limt→∞ s
t = s¯) = 0 2
Proof of theorem 3: Adapting the proof of proposition A in Hofbauer et al. [1981] we
prove the result. If the elasticity of Dk is less than one, then the fitnesses Gk are strictly
decreasing functions. Without restricting generality we assume that G1(0) ≥ G2(0) . . . ≥
GK(0) ≥ 0. We first compute the fixed point s¯ and show that there exists a unique C ≤
G1(0) and a unique s¯ ∈ ∆ such that
G1(p1) = · · ·= Gm(pm) = K
and p1 > 0, . . . , pm > 0, pm+1 = 0, . . . , pK = 0, where m is the largest integer k with
Gk(pk) > C.
Let G−1k (·) be the inverse of Gk(·) defined on [Gk(1), Gk(0)). For s > Gk(0) we set
G−1k (s) = 0. The function
H(c) =
K∑
k=1
G−1k (c)
is defined for c ∈ [max1≤k≤K Gk(1), G1(0)) and strictly decreases from some a ≥ 1 to 0.
Thus, there exists a unique constant C ≤ G1(0) such that H(C) = 1. Let
s¯k = G
−1
k (C), k = 1, . . . , K.
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Then
∑K
k=1 s¯k = 1. If Gk(0) ≤ C then s¯k = 0, if Gk(0) > C then Gk(0) = K and
s¯k > 0. It follows straightforward that s¯ is a fixed point. It is the unique fixed point on the
set {s ∈ ∆ | s1 > 0, . . . , sm > 0}. In particular, if all Gk(0) are equal, s¯ is in the interior
of ∆.
Since (9) is a gradient system all solutions of the differential equation converge to a
fixed point. It remains to study the stability of all fixed points. We show that s¯ is a sink
and all other fixed points are saddles or sources.
Since Gk(0) < K for all k ≤ m and Gk(s¯k) = K for all k > m we have
Gk(0) <
K∑
l=m+1
slGl(s¯l) =
K∑
l=1
s¯lGl(s¯l).
Since additionally δk(s¯k) < 1, by theorem 2 s¯ is a sink.
Now let s′ be another fixed point. If Gk(s
′
k) = ∞ for some k, by proposition 4 s
′ is
attained with probability 0. Assume now that all G′k(s
′
k) are finite. Note that s
′ lies in some
boundary face where sl = 0 for some l ≤ m. Now we consider the system restricted to this
boundary face, and set
H ′(c) =
∑
k∈{l|s′l>0}
G−1k (c).
We have H ′(·) ≤ H(·). There is a unique C′ such that s′k = G
−1
k (C
′), k ∈ {l|s′l > 0}. Since
C′ ≤ C,
Gl(0) > C > C
′ >
K∑
k=1
s′kG(s
′
k)
and by theorem 2 it follows that s′k is a saddle. 2
Proof of theorem 4 By theorem 1 the process converges a.s. to a fixed point of (7).
Since δk(sk) > 1, by theorem 2 all interior fixed points are attained with probability 0. This
argument also holds for fixed points in the interior of a boundary face. (Here we consider
the dynamics of (7) restricted to that boundary face.) Thus, the process converges a.s. to
one of the vertices.
If D′k(0) = D
′
l(0), 0 ≤ k, l ≤ K then all vertices are sinks. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ K be arbitrary
but fixed. Since the elasticities are greater than 1, we have Dl(0) = 0, 1 ≤ l ≤ K and that
Gk(sk) is monotonically increasing. Hence,
D′l(0) = D
′
k(0) = Gk(0) ≤ Gk(1) = Dk(1), l = 1, . . . , K.
Thus, by proposition 3 ek is a sink, and by proposition 8 in Posch[1994] it is attained with
positive probability. 2
